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claims. Today, the substance of natural law is traditional; and now that
the Whigs and Tories seem to be engaged in a dance to the death, in-
sistence upon recognition of inviolable natural rights may aid in arriving
at a compromise.
However, natural law, with its identification of law and morality, with
its ideal man in an ideal state of nature, with its insistence upon criteria
of universal validity, is only a phase of Jurisprudence. Arm-chair specula-
tion on man as man will not produce a science of law. Historically, natural
law afforded a basis for calling to question what had been received aa
authority, and today it plays an important role in filling in the gaps of the
common law. But legal science must take an account of the need for Prose-
cutor Dewey and blue ribbon juries and what it was that happened between
Swift v. Tyson5 and Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.6 As to the former, one may
ask why it is that right principles are revealed only in the presence of
Mr. Dewey, and as to the latter, why it was that Justice Brandeis caught
the gleam but Justice Story failed. However, little can be gained by re-
hearsing the dissentient notions of unbelievers. In fact, the authors attempt
to forestall argument by two methods: first, by declaring that those who
disagree with them are the sort of people who do not believe that "two and
two make four"; 7 and second, by an unqualified use of such words as inher-
ent, truth, fundamental, absolute, and justice. Yet even in the light of such
a caveat, there may be among the sinful those who persist in unbelief, and
for them, the following sentence from Holmes is suggested as a complete
creed:
"The jurists who believe in natural law seem to me to be in that naive
state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and accepted by them
and their neighbors as something that must be accepted by all men every-
where."8
D. M. Fsamn.t
THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED. Edited by Conyers Read. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1938. Pp. xviii, 424.
Offspring of a gathering of the American Historical Association met to
commemorate the sesquicentennial of the "greatest document ever struck
off at one time by the hand of man," this volume comprises twenty-seven
papers, the contributions of as many historians, economists, and political
scientists. Short but meaty, they offer within the compass of some four
hundred pages a commentary on the Constitution that combines the learning,
the judgment, and the reflection of a galaxy of intellectual stars. The
general high quality of the several essays, born to the occasion under the
aegis of a program committee chairmanned by Walton Hamilton, is matched
by the deftness with which shades of emphasis and variations in theme have
been utilized by Conyers Read in editing them for publication.
5. (1842) 16 Pet. 1.
6. (1938) 58 S. Ct. 817.
7. P. 53.
8. Holmes, Natural Law (1918) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 40.
t Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
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Of the three general areas into which the papers fall, the first concerns
the Background of Political, Economic, and Social Ideas behind the Consti-
tution. Charles McIlwain, in opening, sets the general theme by his empha-
sis upon the "great and very significant difference" between positive checks
imposed by one organ of government upon another and negative checks
imposed upon governmental power in the aggregate. The latter constitute
the chief bulwark of liberty through their imposition of definitive consti-
tutional limitations; the former serve but to weaken government through
dissipation of its authority, leaving it incapable not only of doing harm
but of achieving good. Incorporation of positive checks into the constitu-
tional structure is, to Mcllwain, "proof that the founders of our state had
not thoroughly learned the lesson of all past constitutionalism," a lesson
which he proceeds to teach with a broad sweep of two thousand years. Thus
are posed in sharp relief competing conceptions of ways of attaining and
guaranteeing the ideal of a responsive state.
The Bill of Rights, as the embodiment of the school which places its
trust in constitutional limitations, enjoys a four-fold diagnosis at the hands
of able analysts. William Haller's contribution, directed as it is to a
description of those centrifugal forces---disruption of the historic church
and emergence of Puritanism--"which made toleration seem so natural a
necessity to union," tends to feed the main stream of thought given strong
current by Roland Bainton and Herbert Schneider. Both of the latter point,
each with the power of a paradox, to the undertow that is set up by con-
stitutional limitation. To Bainton, stressing the Constitution as the product
of the Age of Reason, "it is the paradox of the century that the Age of
Reason debased reason"; to Schneider, delving into the philosophical pro-
fundities of the conflict, "the basic paradox underlying all bills of rights"
is caught up in the cry, "Let parliament make a law against parliament."
As is reemphasized by Gaetano Salvemini, who carries the analysis into
the area of property, as distinguished from political, rights, there is here
a study in balance, one that demands all the combined skill of the chemist
in the weighing-room and the artist in the garret. But it is the balance
of the atomism of the individual against the collectivism of the community,
not of legislative power against executive authority.
Balanced government in the latter sense, declares Stanley Pargellis, is
unnecessary and ill-equipped to guarantee liberty; what it accomplishes,
rather, is governmental impotency and confusion. Indeed, building on the
fundamental distinction drawn by McIlwain, he entertains the feeling that,
given constitutional limitations as expressed in inclusive bills of rights,
optimum balance has already been effected which a separation of govern-
mental powers serves but to overthrow. Yet Pargellis' criticism is directed,
not at the balance theory in toto, but at so much of it as builds a wall
between executive and legislative power, and thereby eschews a cabinet
type of government. Even with respect to blending legislative with execu-
tive power, he implicitly assumes that the former ingredient is of that
purer, later form of actual representation which Carl Stephensen shows
to have evolved out of a baser notion of virtual, sympathetic representatior
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held to even down to the Reform Bill of 1832; and the blending of judicial
power as well is no part of his recipe for ideal government. Thus Pargellis
would substitute for a tripartite scheme of governmental structure a two-
fold one, with legislature and executive combining to formulate and enforce
an aggressive social policy, the judiciary left independent to guarantee to
the individual a bulwark against violation of the limits that are set upon
governmental authority.
Such a view resolves the antinomy otherwise existing between negative
and positive checks, for by scaling down the latter to this level, the anti-
thetical aspect of separation of powers is done away with while the re-
mainder is retained as a device for implementing constitutional limitations.
Nor does S. E. Thorne's "reexamination of the famous case of Dr. Bonham"
sound a discordant note; though it be true, as Thorne contends, that Coke's
celebrated argument derives from common-law rules of statutory interpre-
tation rather than from natural law ideas freshly introduced from the
Continent, it was little less significant for the future that Coke found
repugnancy in a statute that made a man a judge in his own case. For
out of the stuff of such realizations there developed the concept of inde-
pendence in the judicial function which bottoms all philosophies and ration-
alizations of judicial review.
R. M. McIver devotes his paper to a skillful demonstration of the propo-
sition that European doctrines had as their major effect in America the
playing up of a tremendous emphasis upon balance in constitution-making.
The theories and writing not alone of John Locke and David Hume, but
of Adam Smith and William Blackstone as well, are viewed as contributing
to this political swell. If "never before had the world seen an example of
a balance of powers so elaborate and so consciously contrived as that pro-
vided in the Constitution," it is small wonder that balance mechanisms were
not confined to the negative-check category but overflowed into the positive
as well. Indeed, McIver's climactic point is that the surge was so strong as
to carry the constitution-makers beyond balance of powers as Montesquieu
envisaged it, to federalism. "The functional division of powers does not
imply the constituent division of sovereignty itself. The latter had no real
precedents. It flouted an agelong tradition. * * * Greatly influenced by
European influences as were the builders of the Republic, the fabric they
constructed was in essentials, almost without their knowing it, profoundly
new."
Save for a hint in the closing sentence of the McIver paper that in the
fashioning of federalism the founding Fathers "builded better than they
knew, indeed better than the world yet knows," there is no attempt in
Part I of the present volume critically to appraise the federal concept in
any such manner as Pargellis and McIlwain evaluate the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers. The two other papers which treat of federalism, those of
John Nef and the editor, Conyers Read, are directed rather to an examina-
* tion of industrial history in the two centuries immediately preceding 1787
and to a consideration of its influence at Philadelphia. Both, Nef's the
more explicitly, challenge the Hamilton and Adair thesis which would com-
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press into the phrase "commerce among the states" every last drop of
merchantile nationalism; to them, temporal and other factors belie the con-
tention that an ascendant merchantilist philosophy could have conditioned
the intended content of that phrase so completely as Hamilton and Adair
would have us believe.
In his contribution to Part II of the volume, which explores The Con-
stitution and Its Influence upon American Thought, Max Lerner, on the
other hand, pays his respects to federalism as a principle of American
government the strength of which "lies in the past and not in the future."
Lerner is not to be gainsaid his professional right to prognosticate; it may
be true, however, as the present reviewer has suggested elsewhere, that
what appears to be a disintegration of federalism is after all but a meta-
morphism and that the principle is only casting off an embryonic form.
Certainly the potentialities of a cooperative federalism are appealing for
their attractive reconciliation of regional interests and the national com-
mon good. By the same token, however, federalism is a complex and deli-
cate governmental mechanism, and those who are lured by the enchanting
simplicity and power of nationalism give but short shrift to the values
which lie beneath its awkward exterior. As W. Y. Elliott well puts the
matter in the concluding paragraph of his paper, the larger question, com-
mon to all forms of restraint upon governmental power, be they negative or
positive in character, is the possibility of the survival of the American faith
in a limited government with restrictions on majorities.
That that faith is today meeting skillful challenge needs no proof here
beyond the observation that Elliott's paper lies between those of men who
are of a mind to jettison such ancient cargo in favor of a speedier ship
of state. Henry S. Cominager's articles of voyage are cast in this vein, and
Lerner's embrace it even more wholeheartedly. The notion of a fundamental
law superior to legislative enactments, the idea of natural rights of indi-
viduals which must be protected against government, we are now told, are
historically, not symbols of something abidingly significant in man's organ-
ized relation to man, but only rationalizations fit to justify democratic revo-
lutions and then to die away in the glories of a true democracy by majority
will. Far from constituting a perpetual bulwark for the preservation of
minority tenets from the leveling craze that obsesses majorities, the rights
which meant so much to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have ful-
filled their mission and now threaten, if longer implemented, to thwart
rather than to foster democracy. One must tip his intellectual hat to the
didactic magic that can effect such a transformation; opinions of the United
States Supreme Court do not enshrine all examples of legal legerdemain.
It is unquestionably true, as Ralph Gabriel shows in his paper, that earlier
generations held a view of the cosmic importance of the individual which
has been washed away by the forces of experimentalism and pragmatism,
but it is something else to proclaim the essential validity of a view that
espouses the divine right of majorities to mould their deviating brethren
into the pattern of a super-state.
Two papers, somewhat off the beaten path as we have worn it in these
1939]
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pages, complete the second division of the volume. One is Beard's note on
historiography, in which he reiterates his stand on the necessity of showing,
in constitutional history, the configuration and tension of economic interests
prevailing in the period under consideration. The other, from the inimitable
pen of Walton Hamilton, can only be described as a gem. Here he has set
down in a manner that at once bespeaks depth of insight and breadth of
perspective, that intriguing story of the coming of substantive due process,
of Campbell, of Miller, of Field and the others, the unfolding of which is
as spellbinding in the printed page as it is in the Yale classroom.
Although Part III of the volume promises an insight into the Reper-
cussions of the Constitution outside the United States, little attention is
given to anything but the influence elsewhere of the American principle of
federalism. The uneven, often scant, but nevertheless significant beginnings
of judicial review in the South American nations and elsewhere are not
explored at all, though such development must, from the uniqueness of the
American experiment, find its source in the living Constitution of the United
States. Only in C. W. De Kiewiet's paper on the South African Constitution
is there a reference to judicial review as an institution of limited govern-
ment. In South Africa, De Kiewiet shows in an essay bespeaking scholarly
analysis, the institution was rejected for what it is, a power that can "com-
pel a reconciliation between legislative enactment and constitutional prin-
ciple." The great problem, to the South African constitution-makers, was
the menace of a large native population. "What might not a South African
supreme court do with a 'due process' clause in applying it to the place
of the natives in society?" Judicial review as a means to the realization of
truly limited government does not lose one cubit of its stature from this
frank admission that anything but legislative omnipotence would prove em-
barrassing to the perpetuation of the white man's supremacy. Only Hajo
Holborn, in his observations on the Weimar Constitution, traces out the
influence of the check and balance scheme which was the pride of Phila-
delphia. That influence was, in post-war Germany, rather oblique; the
draftsmen of the Weimar Constitution looked not so much to the juridical
theory of the division of powers as to the actual American practice under
that theory, which places its trust rather in the positive interplay between
legislative and executive or, as Holborn describes it, "the mutual restric-
tion of indirect and direct democracy." Only here and there is there any
reference to the use of bills of rights, after the American pattern, to set
limitations upon governmental authority in the aggregate, to draw the line
between individual liberty and social compulsion.
But if the essays which make up Part III are stingy in these areas, they
are generous in depicting the wholesale influence of the federal principle
among the nations of three continents. W. Menzies Whitelaw sums up this
influence in a turn when he speaks of the r~le of the United States "as the
mother of federations," even as Great Britain has played, with greater
pride," its r8le as the mother of parliaments." Whitelaw's paper concerns
the federal aspects of the Canadian and Australian governmental systems
in relation to the American original; his major theme is the striking parallel
Washington University Open Scholarship
BOOK REVIEWS
in the constitutional development of the three, despite the fact that, espe-
cially in the case of Canada, their beginnings were so incomparable. C. P.
Wright follows with a running account of the more important decisions of
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on dominion-provincial rela-
tions in Canada, reinforcing Whitelaw's emphasis on the tendency of the
American and Canadian systems to grow more and more alike, in the face
of originally antithetical notions regarding the correct situs of the residuum
of governmental power. Wright's study is the only one to consider the
evolution of federalism in terms of judicial decision; the other papers
paint their respective pictures against a broad historical background with-
out the detail that is supplied by whatever contributions have come from
the various judicial mills. De Kiewiet concludes the study of British federal
systems with his paper on the South African development, to which refer-
ence has already been made. He finds that the constitution-makers there
eschewed federalism for the same reason they frowned upon judicial review;
"union, as opposed to federation, permitted the strongest guarantees in
favor of the politically powerful whites." That a similar tendency to asso-
ciate centralism with privileged interests, federalism with individual and
regional liberty, was common throughout Latin America, is apparent from
the paper of C. H. Harding, who treats Argentina and Venezuela rather
cursorily, and from the papers of J. Lloyd Mecham and Percy A. Martin,
who treat, with much greater detail, Mexico and Brazil respectively. In
these four republics of Latin America, however, such associations produced
diametrically opposite political thinking; emerging from an age of highly
centralized, despotic rule, the peoples of these coming nations, influenced
as they were by the great republican example to the north, espoused federal-
ism as a means to the realization of a more truly representative type of
government.
Of the nations on the continent of Europe, Germany had, during the
nineteenth century, the most reason to contemplate the American experi-
mentation with the federal principle, for it too was faced with the funda-
mental problem of balancing unity with diversity in a supreme effort to
build a nation that would endure. Holborn's paper, to which reference has
been made in another connection, touches on the federal element as a point
of contact between German and American political thinking; the interplay
of the two is dwelt upon much more fully by Robert C. Binkiey in his essay
on the Holy Roman Empire. But Binkley's paper is most significant for
its stress upon the diverse ways in which the federal philosophy worked
itself out in Central Europe and the United States. Correctly conceived,
federalism is not a fixed formula but a political philosophy; its manifes-
tations and variations may be many. On the one hand, it may evolve into
a scheme of centralized policy-formulation with decentralized administra-
tion; such Binkley finds to have been true in the Carlsbad system of Central
Europe, and Harding declares the evolutionary process has brought similar
results in Argentina. On the other hand, federalism may adjust itself to
the needs of economically-integrated nations through a process of "uni-
formity without unity," as in Australia, or central administration of policies
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss3/8
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regionally formulated, as seems to be the direction of federalism's evolution
in Brazil and, in the reviewer's opinion, in the United States as well. Save
for Binkley, the emphasis is not upon the variations which time and place
have wrought in the concept of federalism; the adaptations which these
papers reveal strongly point, however, to the fact that even as other nations
during the last one hundred and fifty years have found help in our pioneer-
ing with what Mecham well describes as "the most complicated and delicate
governmental mechanism ever devised by man," so we today may well profit
in turn from the efforts of those countries to derive the political values that
are federalism's and yet mesh that philosophy with the economic and social
realities of the twentieth century.
Fittingly enough, the world-wide perspective which Part III of the
volume imparts to the great American experiment in constitution-making
is bounded fore and aft by papers which seek to evaluate the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries' universal faith in constitutions. Both Geoffrey
Brunn and Carl Becker, the latter especially, trace the constitutional cult
to the forces which were loosed by the Age of Enlightenment and which
gave to man a faith in himself that he had never known before. For the
constitutional cult was a faith of religious and romantic tenor, a faith in
man's ability to build Utopia in the here and now. If today there is less
faith in the ability of a written constitution itself "to delimit with precision
the realms of social compulsion and individual liberty," surely there should
be the more faith that in the effective balancing of these two basic values
the constitutional cultists found the secret of man's political salvation.
FRANK R. STRONG.t
GOODRICH ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS. Second Edition. By Herbert F.
Goodrich. St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1938. Pp. xiv, 562.
The author has accomplished to a high degree his aim as expressed in
the preface to the first edition of giving "a fair view of the subject, in
general, with a more detailed treatment of some interesting and important
parts." The work comprehensively covers representative and especially im-
portant decisions and a substantial amount of juristic thought in the main
conventional divisions of the Conflict of Laws. The discussion of cases and
decisions is concrete to a very commendable extent; the descriptions of
holdings and judicial views are accurate. It is clear that the temptation
to overdraw or color particular phases of judicial handling has been avoided
painstakingly. The work is not dogmatic; on the contrary, constant effort
to be fair and impartial in the presentation of differing viewpoints is con-
spicuous. To hold to that is especially difficult in this field in which there
is so much diversity of adjudication and so much sharp difference of opinion
regarding fundamental modes of approach and analysis. Despite the Re-
statement, so much of the subject remains dependent for its future directions
upon social-economic desiderata and the methods of treatment by which their
demands may be woven into the legal pattern that the presentation of non-
t Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University.
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